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Abstract 
The Coleman Report 
For this History of Education Quarterly Policy Forum, we look at the historical significance of the 1966 
Coleman Report from several different perspectives. The four main essays published here originated as 
presentations for a session on “Legacies of the Coleman Report in US Thought and Culture” at the 
History of Education Society annual meeting in Providence, Rhode Island, in November 2016. Presenters 
for that session— Zoë Burkholder, Victoria Cain, Leah Gordon, and Ethan Hutt—went on to participate in 
an HES-sponsored session entitled “Currents in Egalitarian Thought in the 1960s and 1970s: The 
Coleman Report in American Politics, Media, and Social Science” at the Organization of American 
Historians meeting in New Orleans in April 2017. Thinking that their reflections on the reception and 
influence of the Coleman Report in different contexts would be of broad interest to HEQ readers, we 
asked members of the panel to comment on each other's papers and revise them for this Forum. We 
then invited Harvey Kantor of the University of Utah and Robert Lowe of Marquette University to write 
an introduction summarizing the origins and findings of the Coleman Report, along with their own 
assessment of what the presenters’ essays teach us about its long-term significance. What follows are 
Kantor and Lowe's Introduction, “What Difference Did the Coleman Report Make?,” together with 
substantive essays by Zoë Burkholder of Montclair State University, Victoria Cain of Northeastern 
University, Leah Gordon of Amherst College, and Ethan Hutt of the University of Maryland. 
 
The fiftieth anniversary of the release of Equality of Educational Opportunity (EEO), better known as the 
Coleman Report after its lead author James S. Coleman, has been marked by the publication of 
numerous popular and scholarly retrospectives, including reflections on the report's significance and 
legacy by a number of the nation's leading educational authorities. 1 In contrast to these retrospectives, 
the essays in this issue of the History of Education Quarterly do not seek to analyze the report's 
methodology or to reassess its conclusions regarding the relative weight of school resources and family 
background on educational achievement. Instead, together they help explain why the report was, as 
Christopher Jencks put it in 1969, “the best-known and most controversial piece of educational 
research” of its time and what consequences it had on the evolution of educational policy. 2 This essay 
briefly discusses the origins and some of the key findings of the Coleman Report and, in concert with the 
essays in this forum, considers what difference the report made. 
Situated at the center of the era's struggles over poverty and racial equality, EEO was the result 
of a mandate by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the United States Commissioner of Education to conduct 
a survey on the lack of equality of educational opportunity by race, color, religion, and national origin in 
the nation's public elementary and secondary schools. Exactly why Congress ordered such a survey is 
unclear. Coleman himself suggested it was likely that members of Congress wanted to document the 
gross differences in the quality of the schools that black and white students attended and thereby 
legitimate the fight for school desegregation and equal educational opportunity. 3 But if members of 
Congress simply intended to document the extent of inequality in the provision of educational resources 
across ethnic and racial groups, they got something much more. Not only did the survey collect 
information on the availability of school resources, what it called school “inputs,” but in an effort to 
determine the effectiveness of schools in improving outcomes for students from different ethnic and 
racial groups, it also sought to identify to what degree those inputs were related to school 
achievement.4 
Not everyone who later read the report agreed with this shift in focus from inputs to outputs. In 
their reanalysis of the report, Eric Hanushek and John Kain maintained that prior to focusing on outputs 
it would have been better to more carefully measure the inputs to schools African Americans attended 
and the schools whites attended to show, in fact, the kind and degree of discrimination African 
American children experienced in school. 5 But Coleman argued that focusing on inputs alone would 
have limited the survey's ultimate value, since it would have left unexamined the bigger question of 
which inputs were the important ones. He likened such a strategy to the activities of southern school 
officials who hoped that by increasing spending on teachers, textbooks, and buildings for black schools 
they might thwart pressures for desegregation without ever asking whether these inputs made a 
difference to the achievement of black students. 6 
As Coleman and several observers since have noted, the broader significance of this shift is that 
it constituted a reformulation of what was meant by equal education, or at least how it should be 
measured. Briefly, prior to Coleman, as the congressional mandate for the report implied, mainstream 
thinking was that equal opportunity meant the availability of equal resources to different groups, the 
“inputs” referred to in the report. But by broadening the survey to include the determinants of 
achievement, Coleman essentially redefined equal opportunity to mean equal outcomes for students 
from different ethnic, racial, and economic backgrounds. Many since then have pointed out that this 
way of thinking in effect precluded the possibility that even if achievement remained tied to 
background, schools may have kept these probabilities from getting worse. But after Coleman, when 
policymakers, educators, social scientists, and others talked about equal educational opportunity, they 
increasingly had in mind the schools’ effectiveness in freeing achievement from the students’ 
socioeconomic background. When we talk about (the lack of) equality of educational opportunity today, 
this is typically what we mean. 7 
Much of the report confirmed what many already knew about the extent of racial segregation in 
the nation's schools (black and white students generally attended separate schools in both the North 
and the South) and the performance levels of students of different racial and economic backgrounds on 
achievement tests (black as well as Puerto Rican, Latino, and American Indian students performed 
substantially worse than white students). What was unexpected was what it said about the causes of 
racial and ethnic disparities in achievement. A common assumption at the time was that black students 
achieved less than white students because they went to segregated schools that had less adequate 
facilities and inferior curriculums. But the report contradicted those assumptions. Not only were the 
disparities in resources between black and white schools smaller than anticipated (at least within 
regions), but, even more important, differences between schools did not account for most of the 
observed differences in achievement. According to the report, what mattered more than these 
conventional measures of school quality were the socioeconomic backgrounds and educational 
aspirations of the children students went to school with, students’ sense of control over their own 
destinies, and, by far most important, the socioeconomic background of the individual child. 8 
Though the press at the time almost universally referred to these results as “shocking,” Coleman 
was in fact hardly the first scholar to conclude that family background trumped schooling as the primary 
determinant of educational success. 9 But the sponsorship of the federal government, coupled with the 
scale of the survey and its dense statistical analysis, lent an air of authority to the report's findings that 
earlier studies lacked and all but guaranteed that it would become much more than just another study 
of racial and ethnic differences in educational achievement. Released by the US Office of Education 
(USOE) in July 1966, the final report included data from more than 3,000 schools, 60,000 teachers, and 
nearly 600,000 students in grades 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12, which it analyzed in 737 pages crammed with 
dozens of tables, charts, and figures, an endeavor that even in today's era of “big data” still seems, as 
one observer recently put it, “mind-boggling.” 10 
Although the stamp of government sponsorship, its statistical sophistication, and sheer size 
meant that the report carried more weight than previous studies, it turned out that there was little 
agreement about what it all meant. Popularly characterized as saying “schools don't make a difference, 
families do,” the report was sufficiently ambiguous that given its failure to explain its findings and 
provide recommendations journalists, scholars, and educational activists across a wide spectrum of 
opinion could all find something in it to support their competing educational and political agendas. As a 
result, it was soon cited, as Jencks put it, on “almost every side of every major educational controversy” 
by various constituencies who probably hadn't read it very carefully, if at all, but read into it whatever 
served their interests, even if they contradicted the report's main findings. 11 
As Zoe Burkholder's essay in this forum illustrates, nowhere was this more evident than in the 
debate within black communities in the North about what the report had to say about the relative 
merits of desegregation and community control. 12 To the degree that anything was likely to make a 
difference, the report's finding that impoverished children did better in schools with more economically 
advantaged children seemed to imply that racial integration provided the best chance to expand 
opportunities for black children. Though this conflated Coleman's finding about socioeconomic 
integration with racial integration, black and white liberals cited this in support of their argument that 
desegregation would improve opportunities for black students simply because there were not enough 
middle-class black students to ensure socioeconomic integration in all black schools. 13 As Burkholder 
points out, however, the report appeared precisely at the moment when many African Americans in big 
cities in the Northeast and Midwest had begun to sour on the promise of integration and were 
advocating the internal development of black neighborhoods and institutions. For this reason many of 
them rejected the report because they believed it implied that black children had to go to school with 
white children in order to learn. But the report also found that African American students who felt they 
controlled their own destinies did better than their peers, which some advocates of separate black 
schools, most notably Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) chair Floyd McKissick, seized on to support 
their argument for community control of black schools. 14 
What McKissick ignored was that the survey indicated that black students actually reported a 
greater sense of control in predominantly white schools. The most plausible explanation for this is that 
prior to court-ordered desegregation those black students in racially mixed schools likely came from 
better-off families and felt confident enough to select into them in the first place, despite the hostility 
they knew they were likely to face from white students. Either way, however, if the report's finding that 
black students did better when they felt in control of their destiny was correct, it was not implausible to 
conclude that this sense of control could be better fostered in separate, community-controlled black 
schools, even if the report's findings indicated that school integration was the most efficacious 
educational strategy to increase achievement. Indeed, one irony of the report that Burkholder's essay 
reveals is that its findings were sufficiently open to interpretation that they were used to intensify 
support for integration and community-controlled black schools at the same time. 
If both proponents of integration and community control could plumb the report for evidence to 
support their respective agendas, however, the report cast a long shadow of doubt over compensatory 
education programs like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. The signal 
legislative accomplishment of the Great Society in education, ESEA was premised on the belief that 
devoting more resources to the education of low-income children would expand educational 
opportunity by compensating them for what most policymakers and educators at the time assumed to 
be the cultural disadvantages of growing up in a poor family. Yet if differences in achievement had little 
to do with conventional measures of school quality such as facilities and textbooks, as the report 
implied, it seemed unlikely that disparities in achievement by race, ethnicity, and economic background 
could be reduced simply by spending more on them, which is what programs like ESEA proposed. For 
this reason, historians who have written about the Coleman Report typically have concluded that the 
report's chief historical significance lay in the fact that it exposed the fragile assumptions underlying the 
educational components of the Great Society. 15 
What made the Coleman report so controversial, however, was not what it did or did not have 
to say about the relative merits of desegregation and community control, or what it implied about the 
(in)effectiveness of compensatory education. What made it so controversial was its finding that the 
schools apparently did very little to overcome the influence of socioeconomic background on 
achievement. At odds with what Julie Roy Jeffrey has called “the easy liberal confidence” of the early 
1960s about what education could accomplish, this finding sparked a lively and sometimes acrimonious 
debate among liberals and those on the left about the limits of education as an instrument of egalitarian 
reform that ironically did little to dislodge belief in the capacity of schooling to equalize opportunity that 
the report had seemingly discredited. 16 
Leah Gordon's essay suggests that the persistence of this belief in the importance of education 
as a tool of social policy traces partly to black educators, intellectuals, and civil rights leaders, most 
notably people like Kenneth B. Clark and Charles H. Thompson, who disputed the report's implication 
that schools don't make a difference. To Clark and Thompson, this way of thinking was naïve, if not just 
plain wrong, though not because they thought schools alone could equalize educational opportunity. 
They believed, rather, that arguments like Coleman's that discounted the importance of schooling 
relative to the student's socioeconomic background would likely result in attributing failure to black 
students themselves, work to rationalize disinvestment in schools that black children attended, and 
obviate the perceived need to attack institutionalized racial discrimination inside as well as outside the 
schools. Consequently, while they agreed that equalizing educational opportunity could not be 
accomplished absent changes in employment, housing, and other social institutions as well, they 
rejected the report's implication that schools didn't matter and doubled down on the importance of 
reforming the schools so they would better serve black children. 17 
In her essay, Gordon fleshes out the sources of these differences between Coleman, Clark, 
Thompson, and others on the liberal left, most notably Christopher Jencks, who argued that tinkering 
with the schools, as he put it, would do little to increase opportunity unless the “whole social system” 
were changed. 18 If this debate seemed to open up the possibility of a more capacious vision of 
education and social policy, however, not much resulted from it. Although Coleman provided a rationale 
for school desegregation, 19 neither proposals for the reconstruction of public education along more 
racially egalitarian lines nor for changes in the distribution of power and income between the races had 
much, if any, impact on federal policy. More politically palatable were compensatory education 
programs like ESEA, which persisted even though the report implied they would likely not make much 
difference, and innovations like those proposed by supporters of visual media that Victoria Cain 
describes in her essay. Interpreting Coleman to mean that the educational difficulties of low-income 
children resulted from the educational disadvantages of growing up in a poor family, advocates of 
instructional media sought to reconstruct the social environment of poor children outside of school by 
designing television programs like Sesame Street, which provided instruction in letters and numbers 
while teaching interracial comity without redistributing income or threatening the racial advantages of 
middle-class and upper-middle-class whites. 20 
Gordon's essay implies that part of the reason for this meliorative turn is that the debate over 
the viability of education as an instrument of equal opportunity fragmented the left along racial lines, 
thereby reducing political pressure on the state for a more comprehensive conception of school reform 
that included a direct attack on poverty and racial inequality. By the end of the 1970s, however, in the 
face of a resurgent conservative movement, even many liberals had begun to lose faith in the idea of 
pursuing equal opportunity by attacking the sources of racial inequality in schooling and advocating 
policies like full employment and a guaranteed income. In a society that had become disillusioned with 
the War on Poverty and had turned against the struggle for racial equality, what eventually emerged 
instead was a focus on school reform that not only reinforced the Great Society's tendency to 
educationalize problems of poverty and economic inequality but that also divorced questions of 
educational equity from questions about the effects of racial discrimination and income inequality on 
school outcomes in favor of an emphasis on the use of hard, quantifiable data to evaluate which 
attributes of school organization were most effective in raising achievement and reducing what we now 
call the “achievement gap.” 21 
Ethan Hutt points out in his essay that this reliance on quantifiable data was first evident in 
Project Talent in the late 1950s. But the Coleman Report marked a “watershed” in the development of 
this kind of evidence-based policymaking. 22 Indeed, although the uncertainty the report created about 
the school as a vehicle for equalizing opportunity and social change has never entirely disappeared, the 
report's chief legacy does not lie with its findings about the relative efficacy of school reform to increase 
achievement. 23 More important was the momentum it gave to the development of a technology of 
research and evaluation that viewed the education system, to paraphrase Hutt, as a discrete system of 
organizational variables that could be manipulated and optimized through evidence-based policy 
interventions. 24 
The development of this type of research and evaluation technology has increased our 
knowledge about how schools affect achievement. But there is little evidence that it has engendered 
policies that address the sources of inequality of educational opportunity or that lead to better or more 
equal schooling. To the contrary, by equating school reform with acting on evidence-based 
manipulations of measurable organizational variables, the type of research Coleman inspired has 
worked instead to narrow debate about the possibilities of educational reform that the Coleman report 
initially provoked and to reinforce the idea that the problem of educational inequality can be resolved 
simply by making more and supposedly better educational policy without addressing the social and 
economic context that creates educational inequality in the first place. 
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